Previous investigations have shown that subjects make systematic errors in judging the contingency between responses and outcomes: judged contingency increases with the frequency of positive outcomes in the absence of actual contingency. In the present experiment judgments were obtained when both response alternatives were active choices (as in previous experiments), and when one alternative was to make no response. In the latter case, judgments were more accurate and were less influenced by the frequency of positive outcomes. This result was expected on the hypothesis that when both alternatives are active, subjects tend to assume that in the absence of any response no positive outcomes would occur. This faulty assumption, which is hypothesized to be one source of distortion in the judgment of contingency, is ruled out when the making of no response is an explicit alternative within the task.
In what would appear to be a very simple judgment task, Jenkins & Ward (1965) found a surprising lack of correspondence between intuitive judgments and actual contingency. They made use of a two response-two outcome task. On each of a series of trials the subject chose to make one of two alternative responses and then observed the occurrence of one of two outcomes, a 'score' light or a 'no-score' light (Experiment 1). The subject's task was to judge the degree of control (ability to produce the score light or the no-score light) which their choice of response exerted over the outcomes. The results were that judged control increased with the frequency of occurrence of the score light, the successful outcome, whether success was contingent or non-contingent on the response-choice; the judgment was unrelated to actual contingency. The lack of correspondence between judged control and contingency was not due to the serial presentation of the response-outcome combinations since similar results were obtained when the information was presented in summary form by means of a 2 x 2 matrix. Smedslund (1963) also found a lack of correspondence between intuitive judgments and actual contingency in a task involving two binary variables. In his study nurses were asked to judge the connection between a symptom and a disease. He also found that judgments were unrelated to the actual contingency between disease and symptom both when the information was presented sequentially over a series of trials and in summary form within a 2 x 2 matrix. Smedslund (1963) concluded '... that adult subjects with no statistical training apparently have no adequate concept of correlation ' (p. 165) .
Several reasons have been offered for the lack of correspondence between contingency and judgment in the tasks used by Jenkins and Ward (1965) and Smedslund (1963) , and also by Ward and Jenkins (1965) . In a recent article on magical thinking, Shweder (1977) argued that the results simply reflected a universal disinclination of normal adults to draw correlational lessons from their experience. He presented many examples to support his thesis that correlation is a non-intuitive concept which is generally absent from the everyday thinking of most normal adults. Peterson & Beach (1967) , after reviewing a number of experiments in which accurate judgments of correlation between multi-valued variables were found, suggested that there is something about the 'special case' of the 2 x 2 matrix for binary variables which leads subjects to attend to only some of the relevant information. However, they did not identify any special characteristic of binary variables that might be responsible. Tversky & Kahneman (1973) have shown that the frequency of the co-occurrence of events tends to be overestimated in terms of the ease with which relevant instances come to mind; that is in terms of availability. They show how the availability heuristic can lead to misjudgment of the frequency of cooccurrence and to the judgment of a causal or predictive relation where none exists. They suggested that misestimation of this kind might be responsible for the lack of relation between actual contingency and judgment in the binary task. However, Smedslund (1963) and Ward and Jenkins (1965) found that such estimates were not distorted in a way which could account for the intuitive judgments of subjects in the binary variable situation. Furthermore, since judgments are unrelated to actual contingency even when the relevant frequency information is displayed for the subject in a 2 x 2 matrix, misestimations are unlikely to be the cause. Jenkins and Ward (1965) suggested that a major source of error in judgment was that instead of comparing probabilities of events within the task, success in the task was judged against an inappropriately assumed baseline. Wason and JohnsonLaird (1972) , in their analysis of fallacies in propositional reasoning, show convincingly that there is a strong disposition to conclude from the premise, if p then q, to the conclusion that not-p leads to not-q. This error, called denial of the antecedent in treatments of syllogistic reasoning, suggests a parallel case for the Jenkins & Ward (1965) situation. The subject made one or the other of two active responses on each trial and sometimes observed the occurrence of the favourable outcome (the score light). Perhaps he assumed that had he made no response the favourable outcome would never have occurred. We shall refer to this assumption as the not p-not q assumption. Against this assumed baseline of no response-no favourable outcome, the frequency of successes obtained when responding in whatever way he chose to respond would be a sensible index of control for a subject.
The view that instead of comparing outcomes for response 1 with those for response 2, subjects compare outcomes obtained when responding to an assumed baseline of no favourable outcomes for no response, suggests a way to improve the judgments. If the alternatives within the task were to be specified as making a response versus making no response, the subject would be confronted with the observations of what happens when no response is made. He would be prevented from making the not />-not q assumption and would therefore be more likely to make veridical judgments. The major purpose of the present experiment was to examine this implication.
In the Jenkins and Ward (1965) experiments the subjects were instructed to judge the degree of control which their responses exerted over the outcomes. Perhaps the term control disposed subjects towards a judgment based on the frequency of favourable outcomes, whereas some other term might succeed in setting the subjects for accurate judgments of contingency. The English language contains a large number of terms which are abstractly synonymous with contingency such as influence, correlation, association, dependence, and connection. In order to learn whether the term used to identify the judgment was an important setting factor, some subjects in the present experiment were asked to judge the extent to which their response choice influenced the outcome of the trial. Others were asked to judge the degree to which the response device itself was connected to the machine that displayed the outcomes. There are grounds for expecting more veridical judgments under the instruction to judge the degree of connection. The influence instruction, like the control instruction, may be taken as a challenge to produce successes. It raises the implicit question, 'How successful are you in influencing the outcomes?,' which perhaps encourages a confusion between favourable outcomes and the degree of influence. On the other hand, the instruction to judge the degree of connection should induce a more objective set. The subject can only assess the connection; it makes no sense to ask how well he managed to connect the response device to the outcome device.
METHOD

Subjects
The subjects were thirty first-year and secondyear undergraduate students at McMaster University. They received course credit or $2.00 for their participation.
Apparatus
A two-field projection tachistoscope was used to present one of two slides: a lake scene with the Loch Ness Monster poking his head out of the lake (outcome M) or thesame lake scene without the monster (outcome M). A 17 cm x 12 cm projection screen and a joystick were located on the table at which the subject sat. Timing of events, recording of responses, and randomization and presentation of slides were controlled by a PDP-8E computer located in a separate room.
Procedure
Three groups of subjects participated. Two groups were run under an influence (I) instruction and differed only with respect to the joystick. The joystick for the iR-1 group had one active choice position; the resting position of the stick was to one side and the active position of the stick was to the other side. The joystick for the 2R-I group had two active choice positions; the resting position of the stick was in the middle and the two active-positions were to either side. A third group, 2R-C, was included to determine whether a connection (C) instruction would result in more veridical judgments than an influence instruction when the subject was required to make an active response on each trial. The number of subjects in each group is indicated on Figure 1 .
The tachistoscope was programmed to present a slide for 100 msec once every 2 sec in blocks of 100 presentations. The subject was required to position the joystick during the 2 sec interpresentation interval. In the iR-1 condition he was either to leave the stick in its resting position (that is, do nothing), or to move it to the active position during the 2 sec interval. If he chose to move the stick, he was to let it return to the resting position before the next slide was presented. In the 2R-I and 2R-C conditions the subject was to move the stick either to the left or to the right during the 2 sec interpresentation interval, letting the stick return to the resting (middle) position before the next slide was presented.
Each subject read the appropriate instructions at the beginning of the experimental session and the experimenter answered any questions concerned with clarification of the instructions. Ten to 20 slides were presented to ensure that the subject understood the instructions. The experimenter then left the room.
Instructions (1R-I)
The screen in front of you will light up briefly every 2 seconds, showing either the Loch Ness Monster raising its head out of the lake, or the same lake scene without the monster. During the 2 seconds prior to each slide presentation, you can either leave the stick in its resting position or you can move it to the right. If you do move it, let it return to its resting position before the slide is presented. Thus, each trial consists of a two-second response period followed by a brief slide presentation. After 100 trials we will ask you whether you think you influenced which scene appeared by the position of the joy stick.
You have complete influence if you determine on each trial whether or not the monster appears by the position you chose for the stick. You have some influence if you can increase and decrease the chance that the monster will appear by your choice, even though you cannot be sure. You have no influence if you cannot alter the chance that the monster will appear by your choice of position.
There will be 10 separate problems, each consisting of 100 trials. At the end of each problem I will ask you to answer two questions:
1. Where you able to influence the surfacing of the monster by the position you chose?
2. If yes, how strong was your influence? (a 100 point scale marked in units of five with the extremes labelled very weak, very strong, and the middle labelled moderate).
Instructions (2R-I)
These instructions were identical with those for the iR-1 condition except that the following sentence was substituted for the second and third sentences. During the 2 seconds prior to each slide presentation, you must position the stick to the left or to the right, letting it return to the middle (resting) position before the slide is presented.
The screen in front of you will light up briefly every 2 seconds, showing either the Loch Ness Monster raising its head out of the lake, or the same lake scene without the monster. During the 2 seconds prior to each slide presentation, you must position the stick to the left or to the right, letting it return to the middle (resting) position before the slide is presented. Thus, each trial consists of a two-second response period followed by a brief slide presentation. After 100 trials we will ask you whether the stick is connected to the slide projectors. As you can see there are two slide projectors. The carousel in one projector contains the slide with the monster; the carousel in the other projector contains the slide without the monster. If the stick is connected to the two projectors during the 100 trials, then one position of the stick, say the left position, is wired to projector A and therefore slide A, and the other position of the stick, the right position, to projector B and therefore slide B. Under these circumstances, the stick position you choose will determine which slide is presented on that trial. If you move the stick to the left, A would always be presented; if you chose right, B would always be presented.
If the stick is disconnected from the two projectors during the 100 trials, then which slide is presented on each trial is controlled by the machine in the next room. Under these circumstances your choice of stick position would have no influence over which slide was presented on that trial. Slide A would be presented as many times after a left position choice as after a right position choice.
It is possible that the stick is connected to the projector on some trials but is disconnected on others, and therefore your choice of stick position would determine which slide was presented on some trials, but not on other trials.
There will be 10 separate problems, each consisting of 100 trials. During any problem the connection could exist on all 100 trials, on zero trials, or on any number of trials between o or 100. The 10 problems differ in the number of trials during which the connection is in effect.
At the end of each problem I will ask you to answer two questions: 1. Was the stick connected to the projector? YES NO 2. If yes, on approximately how many trials was it connected? (a scale marked in intervals of 5 trials, ranging from o to 100 trials).
The ten problems, five non-contingent and five contingent, are shown in Figure 1 . Each problem consisted of 100 slide presentations. The ten problems were presented in a different random order to each subject. Under the 1R condition, it was always the active-position that increased the probability of the monster slide in the contingent problems; under the 2R conditions, it was always the same active-position that increased the probability of the monster slide in all the contingent problems.
Each subject had a booklet consisting of ten pages. On each page were printed the two questions from the instructions. At the end of each problem the subject completed one page of the booklet and then told the experimenter, over an intercom, that he was ready for the next problem.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For each problem the subject's answer to Question 2 provides a measure of judged influence or connection. If the subject responded 'NO' to Question 1, then his judged influence (connection) for that problem was scored as zero. For each subject the mean of the ratings of the five non-contingent problems and the mean of the ratings of the five contingent problems were determined. The group means on the contingent problems are very similar for the three conditions (40.2, 39.0, and 41.0 for iR-1, 2R-I, and 2R-C respectively), but the group means on the non-contingent problems differ. The mean of the iR-1 group (8.0) is considerably smaller than the mean of either of the 2R groups (18.2 and 22.6 for 2R-I and 2R-C respectively). Of the 12 1R subjects, 7 responded 'NO' to every noncontingent problem, while of the 18 2R subjects only 3 responded 'NO' to every noncontingent problem. A j? test for independence shows this difference to be significant (X\ 2 corrected = 3.91, p < .05). In general, 1R subjects responded more appropriately to the non-contingent problems than did the subjects in either of the 2R groups.
The necessary information for accurate judgments is the difference between the two monster conditional probabilities. This difference, AP, can be determined for each problem from the subject's responseoutcome matrix, where
In Figure 1 the mean judgment and the mean AP for each condition are shown for each of the ten problems. The judgments of the iR-1 subjects are essentially constant across the five non-contingent problems, any variation being mirrored by chance variation in AP. In contrast the judgments of both groups of 2R subjects show a systematic departure from AP. Mean judgments of influence and of connection increase with increasing probability of the monster under the two conditions requiring the subject to make an active response before each slide presentation. For all three groups the overall probability of monster occurrence appears to exert some influence on the judgments of the contingent problems. There is a tendency to assign a higher judgment score to the contingent problem with the overall higher monster probability than to the contingent problem with a similar AP value but a lower overall monster probability. This is most noticeable for judgments of the .7-.9 problem compared with judgments of the .1-.3 problem. NONCONTINGENT FIGURE 1 Mean judgment and mean AP for each condition for each of the 10 problems. For the noncontingent problems the probability of monster occurrence is shown on the abscissa. For the contingent problems the conditional probability of monster occurrence for the two response alternatives is shown on the abscissa. For example, .7-.9 represents a problem where P(M |«,) = .7 and P(M | R 2 ) = .9.
higher than the means of either of the 2R groups (.52 and .61 for 2R-I and 2R-C respectively) and the variance of the 1R group (.022) is smaller than the variance of either of the 2R groups. (.146 and .098 for 2R-I and 2R-C respectively). While high values of r occur in all three groups, low values are only seen in the 2R groups. The results of a Mann-Whitney U test indicate that the distribution of r values generated by the 1R group is different from the distribution generated by the two 2R groups (Z = 1.97,
P<o 5 ).
Following the approach of Ward and Jenkins (1965) , the relationship between judgment and various summary descriptions, other than AP, of the response-outcome matrix was examined. Adopting the nota- tion of the response-outcome matrix illustrated in Figure 2 ,
Rather than basing his judgment on the absolute difference between the two monster conditional probabilities (AP), the subject might use the absolute difference between the two monster frequencies (Af = \a -c\).
The absolute difference between the number of monsters following one response and the number following the other response will only result in a valid assessment of influence (connection) when the two responses are made equally often. Another possibility is for the subject to think of one response as the monsterproducing response and the other as the no-monster-producing response, and to accumulate the number of confirming cases. He could then compare the number of confirming cases with the number of discontinuing
cases (Ad = \(a + d) -(b + c)\), and judge no influence (connection)
when Ad = o and complete influence (connection) when Ad = 100. Like Af, Ad will only result in a valid assessment when the two responses are made equally often. The subject could base his judgment solely on monster frequency. He might simply accumulate the number of monsters presented (#m -a + c), and judge increasing influence (connection) with increasing monster frequency. Alternatively, he could consider the response which produces the greater number of monsters as the successful response, and base his judgment on the number of successes (#5 = the larger of a or c). The monster-counting rules will always lead to an invalid assessment of influence (connection). Product-moment correlations of judgments with the values given by each of the four alternative judgment rules were determined. Thus, for each subject there were 5 values of r, one for each of the five rules (AP, Af, Ad, #m, and #5). The highest value of r for each subject was used to define the best rule for that subject. Table 1 shows the number of subjects best described by each rule. Two aspects of the data are especially worth noting. First while 8 of the 12 1R subjects (67%) are best described by the AP rule, only 5 of the 18 2R subjects (28%) are best described by this rule. Second, while not one of the 1R subects is best described by either of the monster-counting rules, 6 of the 18 2R subjects (33%) are best described by this type of rule. A £ test for independence shows that the distribution of subjects by the three rule categories (AP, frequency-comparison and monstercounting) depends upon group, 1R or 2R (X2 2 = 6.57, p < .05).
The differences in the judgment patterns of 1R and of 2R subjects may reflect different sampling strategies, such as responsealternation pattern. The number of alternations from one response to the other was determined for each problem and averaged over all ten problems. Subjects in the 2R-C condition alternate an average of 49 times during 100 slide presentations, whereas both 2R-I and iR-1 subjects alternate an average of 28 times. Thus, 2R-C subjects differ from 2R-I subjects in number of alternations but nevertheless have similar judgment patterns. The number of alternations cannot account for the difference in judgment patterns between 1R and 2R subjects. 
ADDITIONAL DATA
Twenty two additional subjects have been run under the influence instruction; 14 with two active-responses (2R-I) and 8 with one active-response (1R-I). 1 In Figure 3 mean judgment and mean AP for these additional subjects are shown for each problem. As in the major experiment the judgments of the 1R subjects are essentially constant across the non-contingent problems, while the judgments of the 2R subjects increase systematically with increasing monster probability. Furthermore, monster probability exerts no influence on the judgments of the contingent problems by 1R subjects, while clearly affecting the judgments of contingent problems by 2R subjects. 'The wording of the instructions differed in minor ways from the wording used in the major experiment. Copies of the instructions are available from the authors.
1R-I Condition
In the major experiment the subject was instructed that when he moved the joystick to the active position, he should allow it to return to the resting-position before the slide presentation. Each choice of the active position was discrete. The eight additional 1R subjects were allowed to leave the joystick in the active-position for as long as they wished.
2R-I Condition
Seven of the 14 subjects used the joystick with the two active positions. For the remaining seven subjects two choice buttons, located in the arm of the chair, were used. The subject was instructed to press either choice button '1,' or choice button '2.' Depression of a third button, the test button, resulted in the presentation of one of the outcomes. Table n shows the distribution by rule of all 52 subjects (30 in the major experiment plus the 22 additional subjects). A j? test for independence indicates that the distribution of subjects among the three rule categories depends upon the experimental condition (* 2 2 = 13.93, P < 001).
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In Figure 4 mean judgment is shown as a function of number of successes (#5) for the 18 2R subjects in the major experiment (Figure 4a) , for the 7 additional 2R subjects with the joystick (Figure 4b) , and for the 7 additional 2R subjects with the choice buttons (Figure 4c ). Although in the major experiment judgment of the contingent problems tended to be higher than for noncontingent problems with the same number of successes, on the average, the judgments of 2R subjects are well described by the number of successes.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Our results show that the nature of the response alternatives makes a substantial difference to the judgment of contingency. When the choice was between an active response and no response, judgments were in better agreement with actual contingency than when the choice was between two active responses. When the alternative was to respond or not respond, the judgments of 75% of the subjects were more highly correlated with a valid index of contingency given by the difference between conditional outcome probabilities (AP) than with any of several less valid bases of judgment. On the other hand, when the choice was between two active responses, the judgments of only 25% of the subjects were best described by the valid rule, and subjects were far more likely to judge that their response influenced outcomes when there was, in fact, no contingency. The mere frequency of the positive outcome, the surfacing of the Loch Ness Monster, exerted an upward bias on the judgment of contingency in both conditions, but the bias was much stronger when there were two active responses. In the latter case the judgments of 44% of the subjects were more highly correlated with rules based on the frequency of positive outcomes than with any of the other rules. This compared with only 5% when the alternatives were to respond or not respond. Although there were reasons to suppose in advance that the connection instruction would yield more accurate judgments than the influence instruction, the type of instruction had no effect on judgment. On the other hand, it had a very clear effect on the strategy of sampling the alternatives. Under the connection instruction alternation between the two responses was far more frequent than it was under the influence instruction. Properly understood, the connection instruction should discourage the belief that particular patterns of choices produce a given outcome and this might account for the effect of instruction on the pattern of use of the alternatives. The results show that systematic distortions in the judgment of contingency are not peculiar to conditions that encourage a belief in the efficacy of patterns of responses.
The results support the view that a major reason for correlation of judged contingency with the frequency of a positive outcome lies in the tendency to assume that if a response is followed by a positive event then in the absence of a response the positive event would also be absent. When both alternatives require an active response, there is no evidence to counteract the not p-not q assumption. Given this assumption, it is reasonable to conclude that the more often the positive event appears when responding, the more influence responding exerts over the outcomes (and the more likely the response device is to be connected to the outcome generating device). When the no-response alternative is included within the set, the not p-not q assumption will not be made because the observations are there to provide the basis of what appears to be the natural comparison; namely, between the results of action and no action.
The faulty not p-not q assumption is not proposed as the sole source of systematic error in the judgment of contingency in the binary task. It is clear from several studies (Smedslund, 1963; Ward & Jenkins, 1965) , as well as from the present results, that subjects sometimes base their judgments on only part of the information needed for correct judgments, even when one of the alternatives on the input side is characterized as the absence of an active event. For example, Ward and Jenkins (1965) asked subjects to judge the contingency between an input variable represented as seeding clouds or not seeding clouds and an output variable of rainfall or no rainfall. The frequency of rainfall following not seeding would appear to provide a natural baseline for judgment, yet the judgments of the majority of subjects were best predicted by a count of the number of confirming cases 3 (seed and rain plus no-seed and no-rain), rather than by a difference in conditional probabilities of rain given seeding and rain given no seeding (AP). Thus, on the average, Ad was the best rule for the Ward and Jenkins' subjects while AP was the best rule for the iR-1 subjects in the present study. The counting rules provided an inadequate description for both sets of subjects. It appears that the tendency observed by Jenkins and Ward (1965) to base judgments on the frequency of favourable outcomes was virtually eliminated by labelling one of the input variables as the absence of an active event.
There are apparently many ways to go wrong when judging contingency. Estes (1976a, b) , in a task which differs considerably from the binary variable task used in the present experiment, has shown that subjects tend to base judgments on frequencies rather than on probabilities. A reliance on frequency (A/) rather than prob-'Number of confirming cases in Ward and Jenkins (1965) is the same as the M rule in the present experiment. ability (AP) is sometimes observed in the binary task as well. Further, one can go wrong even when the judgment is based on a comparison of probabilities if the probabilities have been misestimated. The concept of availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) points to one source of faulty probability estimation.
The not p-not q assumption might be operating to produce some of the distortions which have been assigned to the availability heuristic. Consider an example which is developed in some detail by Tversky & Kahneman (1973) . A clinician is assessing the likelihood that a depressed patient will attempt suicide. Since attempted suicide is a dramatic and salient event, previous suicidal patients come to mind easily. The clinician notes that nearly all of the suicidal patients he can recall were severely depressed. He judges the likelihood that his current patient will attempt suicide by the degree of resemblance or similarity between the recalled cases and the current patient. If the current patient is similar to the previous depressed patients, he concludes that suicide is likely; if the current patient is unlike previous depressed patients, he concludes that suicide is unlikely. The selective recall of suicidal patients fits the availability concept. However, the conclusion that the absence of depression predicts no suicide is an example of the faulty not p-not q assumption. Since non-suicidal patients were not recalled, the clinician has no information about the co-occurrence of non-depression and no suicide.
The not p-not q assumption appears to be pervasive and one is led to ask how it might arise. An asymmetry between an event and a non-event must be at the root of the assumption. The proposition is that observing the co-occurrence of two events, say «i and e 2 , leads us to expect that if e x had been absent, e 2 would also have been absent. But note that the assumption is not made in the other direction. Observing the absence of e\ and the absence of e 2 does not lead to the assumption that the presence of e\ would lead to e 2 . For example, an employee who asks for a raise and gets it (^1 and e 2 ) might conclude that had he remained silent he would not have received the raise. But if the employee observes that he neither asked for nor received a raise, he is not likely to conclude that had he asked for a raise he would have received it. It is the conjunction of events, not of non-events, that leads to the faulty assumption. Therefore, to have a general understanding of what circumstances give rise to the faulty assumption one would have to understand the perceptual principles by which events are distinguished from non-events.
In everyday circumstances we seek the causes of events rather than of prevailing states or non-events. Further, in looking for the cause of an event, we naturally seek out another event rather than a prevailing state. To put it a different way, when we notice a departure from the prevailing state, an unusual happening, we are ready to take as a cause the co-occurrence of another unusual happening. In the present experiment the making of a response has the status of an event, whereas doing nothing is taken to be a prevailing state or a non-event. The co-occurrence of the two events, an active response and the monster, satisfies the conditions which give rise to the judgment of a causal relation under everyday circumstances.
R£SUM£
Des recherches anterieures ont montre que les sujets font des erreurs systematiques quand ils ont a juger la dependance entre leurs reponses et la consequence de ces reponses: la dependance est jugee plus forte quand augmente la frequence des consequences positives en l'absence de dependance reelle. Dans les experiences ici decrites, les jugements sont portes lorsque les deux reponses possibles sont des choix actifs (comme dans les experiences anterieures) et lorsque l'un des choix est de ne pas donner de reponse. En ce dernier cas, les jugements s'averent plus exacts et sont moins influences par la frequence des consequences positives. Ce resultat etait a prevoir si Ton fait I'hypothese que, lorsque les deux choix offerts sont actifs, les sujets sont portes a presumer que l'absence de toute reponse ne devrait entrainer aucune consequence positive. Cette fausse presomption, dont on fait l'hypothese qu'elle est source de distorsion dans les jugements de dependance, est eliminee Iorsque la tache prevoit explicitement la possibility de ne donner aucune reponse.
